The Art of Compromise
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003.
"A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities,"
IDEI Working Papers
182, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities," Working Papers 1171, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2000.
"Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 46-79, September.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Discussion Papers 1232, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 1998. "Government turnover in parliamentary democracies," Bulletins 7453, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Working Papers 98-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Feddersen, Timothy J., 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 611-621, September.
- Mo, Jongryn, 1995. "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 914-924, December.
- Moravcsik, Andrew, 1991. "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 19-56, January.
- Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December.
- Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
- David Austen-Smith, 2000. "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1235-1269, December.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996.
"A Theory of Divided Government,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
- Alesina, Alberto Francesco & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Scholarly Articles 34222831, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004.
"An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999. "An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures," Discussion Papers 1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kannai, Yakar, 1977. "Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-56, March.
- Cressman, Ross & Gallego, Maria, 2009.
"On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 64-83, July.
- Ross Cressman, Maria Gallego, 2005. "On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents," Working Papers eg0043, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
- Thomson, William, 1994.
"Cooperative models of bargaining,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284,
Elsevier.
- Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
- Morelli, Massimo, 1999. "Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 809-820, December.
- Baron, David P., 1998. "Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 593-609, September.
- David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967.
- Hans Peters, 1992. "A Criterion for Comparing Strength of Preference with an Application to Bargaining," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(5), pages 1018-1022, October.
- Stéphane Rottier & Francis Bloch, 2002.
"Agenda control in coalition formation,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 769-788.
- Bloch, Francis & Rottier, Stéphane, 1999. "Agenda Control in Coalition Formation," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- BLOCH, Francis & ROTTIER, Stéphane, 1999. "Agenda control in coalition formation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jacques Cremer & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000.
"Federal Mandates by Popular Demand,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 905-927, October.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2000. "Federal Mandates by Popular Demand," IDEI Working Papers 120, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2001.
- Levmore, Saul, 1992. "Bicameralism: When are two decisions better than one?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 145-162, June.
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988.
"Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000.
"A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 73-88, March.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Cressman, Ross & Gallego, Maria, 2009.
"On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 64-83, July.
- Ross Cressman, Maria Gallego, 2005. "On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents," Working Papers eg0043, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
- Cressman, Ross & Gallego, Maria, 2009.
"On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 64-83, July.
- Ross Cressman, Maria Gallego, 2005. "On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents," Working Papers eg0043, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
- James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
- Maria Gallego & David Scoones, 2011. "Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 591-610, April.
- Hughes, Niall, 2016.
"Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.
- Hughes, Niall, 2014. "Voting In Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," Economic Research Papers 270228, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting In Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 03, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Hughes, Niall E, 2014. "Voting in Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1055, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting In Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1097, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting in Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," Economic Research Papers 269728, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.
- Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2011. "Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 395-408, March.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 893-907, May.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2011.
"Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 311-327, June.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2008. "Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences," MPRA Paper 12610, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2009.
- Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters' representativeness," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?," Working Papers 2009/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Discussion Papers 1297, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2011.
"Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 311-327, June.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2008. "Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences," MPRA Paper 12610, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2009.
- Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?," Working Papers 2009/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters' representativeness," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007.
"Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 847-850, November.
- Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Juan Ortner, 2014. "Political Bargaining in a Changing World," 2014 Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Harrie Swart, 2008.
"Negotiating a Stable Government: An Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition Formation Model,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 445-464, September.
- Harrie de Swart & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008. "Negotiating a stable government - an application of bargaining theory to a coalition formation model," Post-Print halshs-00353375, HAL.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006.
"Proposal Rights and Political Power,"
American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 441-448, April.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," Wallis Working Papers WP38, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002.
"Political economics and public finance,"
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659,
Elsevier.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Economics and Public Finance," Working Papers 149, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2235, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar P., 2008.
"Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 554-561, September.
- Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12173, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Working Papers 2006.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014.
"The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results,"
Working Papers
1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 2015. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1056, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2002. "Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting: Part 1," NBER Working Papers 8973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014.
"Corruption and power in democracies,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
- Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2008. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/192, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Francesco Giovannoni, 2012. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/624, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
More about this item
Keywords
Vote balancing; intergovernmental bargaining; legislative ratification; willingness to compromise;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0042. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Glen Stewart (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sbwluca.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.