A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities
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- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities," IDEI Working Papers 182, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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- Francis Bloch & Unal Zenginobuz, 2007.
"The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(3), pages 199-216, November.
- Bloch, Francis & Zenginobuz, Unal, 2004. "The Effect of Spillovers on the Provision of Local Public Goods," MPRA Paper 186, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Oct 2006.
- Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2091-2106, November.
- Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
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Keywordsvoting; externalities; federalism;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-01-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-01-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2004-01-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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