An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities
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- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas, 2000.
"Federal Mandates by Popular Demand,"
IDEI Working Papers
120, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2001.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-46, May.
- Thomas J. Nechyba, 1996.
"Existence of Equilibrium and Stratification in Local and Hierarchical Tiebout Economies with Property Taxes and Voting,"
NBER Technical Working Papers
0190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas. J. Nechyba, 1997. "Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 277-304.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas, 1994.
"In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote,"
IDEI Working Papers
33, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Cremer, J. & Palfrey, T.R., 1994. "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Papers 94.335, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Working Papers 879, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas, 2003.
"A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities,"
IDEI Working Papers
182, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities," Working Papers 1171, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Klevorick, Alvin K. & Kramer, Gerald H., 1973. "Social choice on pollution management: the genossenschaften," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 101-146, April.
- Epple, Dennis & Romer, Thomas, 1991. "Mobility and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 828-58, August.
- Gerald H. Kramer & Alvin K. Klevorick, 1974. "Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 539-547.
- Roger H. Gordon, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 567-586.
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