Mobility and Redistribution
The ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake. In this paper, the authors look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system. They ask how much redistribution occurs when only local government can have tax/transfer instruments, individuals can move freely among jurisdictions, and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies. Local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.
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