In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote
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|Date of creation:||1994|
|Publication status:||Published in European Economic Review, vol. 40, Elsevier, 1996, p. 43-60.|
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- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994.
"How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(1), pages 85-107, February.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1993. "How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 1993. "How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 39, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994. "How much Europe? Subsidiarity, centralization and fiscal competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 19838, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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