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Mehr-Ebenen Jurisdiktionssysteme: Zur variablen Architektur von Integration

  • Lars P. Feld

    ()

    (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

  • Wolfgang Kerber

    ()

    (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

Mit der rasant fortschreitenden Globalisierung und dem dynamischen Prozess der europä¬ischen Integration sind in den letzten zwei bis drei Jahrzehnten grundlegende traditionelle Denk¬kategorien über den Staat und die von ihm zu betreibende Wirtschaftspolitik systema¬tisch in Frage gestellt worden. In der bisherigen Denktradition steht der völkerrechtlich sou¬veräne Nationalstaat im Mittelpunkt, bei dem quasi-natürlich alle wirtschafts- und finanzpoli¬tischen Kompetenzen angesiedelt sind. Diese Kompetenzen übt er als staatlicher Monopolist gegenüber einer Menge von Individuen als Bürger aus (u.a. mit dem Problem der Kontrolle dieses Leviathan). Zwar mag der Nationalstaat föderal organisiert sein, aber dies hat keine eigenständige Bedeutung in der geltenden Denktradition. Jenseits der souveränen National¬staaten gibt es hier nur die Ebene des Welthandels mit der globalen Arbeitsteilung, die wirt¬schaftspolitisch fast ausschließlich von der Leitidee des Freihandels und des Abbaus von Han¬delsschranken geprägt ist. Dieser traditionelle Analyserahmen ist jedoch durch eine Reihe von Entwicklungen inzwi¬schen unzureichend und nicht mehr zweckmäßig:

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Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series Marburg Working Papers on Economics with number 200605.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in “Ökonomische und politische Grenzen von Wirtschaftsräumen”, Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Berlin, Duncker & Humblodt
Handle: RePEc:mar:volksw:200605
Contact details of provider: Postal: Universitätsstraße 25, 35037 Marburg
Phone: 06421/28-1722
Fax: 06421/28-4858
Web page: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/
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