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Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges

  • Huber, Bernd
  • Runkel, Marco

This paper provides an explanation for the increasing reliance on revenue from user charges on excludable public goods. We develop a model with many identical countries. The government of each country imposes a source-based tax on capital and supplies an excludable public good to heterogeneous households. Without tax competition, the price on the public good is zero. Tax competition induces each country to choose a positive price. The reliance on user charges turns out to be increasing in the intensity of tax competition measured by the number of countries. A coordinated decrease in user charges is shown to raise welfare in all countries.

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Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Reprints in Economics with number 19389.

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Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Tax and Public Finance 3 16(2009): pp. 321-336
Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:19389
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  1. Burns, Michael E & Walsh, Cliff, 1981. "Market Provision of Price-excludable Public Goods: A General Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 166-91, February.
  2. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2001. "The Role of Prices on Excludable Public Goods," Working Paper Series 2001:14, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  3. Oakland, William H., 1987. "Theory of public goods," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 9, pages 485-535 Elsevier.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," MPRA Paper 6549, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd & Mintz, Jack, 2005. "Capital Mobility and Tax Competition," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 1-62, December.
  6. Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 441-458, March.
  7. Robert Tannenwald, 1990. "Taking charge: should New England increase its reliance on user charges?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 56-74.
  8. Huber, Bernd & Runkel, Marco, 2009. "Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges," Munich Reprints in Economics 19389, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
  10. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber & Jack Mintz, 2003. "Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 956, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Edward Calthrop & Stef Proost, 1998. "Road Transport Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 335-348, April.
  12. John O'Hagan & Michael Jennings, 2003. "Public Broadcasting in Europe: Rationale, Licence Fee and Other Issues," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 31-56, February.
  13. Brito, Dagobert L & Oakland, William H, 1980. "On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 691-704, September.
  14. Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model," Munich Reprints in Economics 19402, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  15. Wassmer, Robert W. & Fisher, Ronald C., 2002. "Interstate variation in the use of fees to fund K-12 public education," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 87-100, February.
  16. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
  17. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
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