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Milton Friedman und der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen Elternkompetenz und Anteilscheine am Schulbudget – Gedanken über Reformpotenziale

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  • Hans-Günter Krüsselberg

    (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

Abstract

Die Diskussion reißt nicht ab. „Deutschlands Bildung hinkt hinterher“. Andreas Schleicher, der Sprecher der OECD in Bildungsangelegenheiten, wirft den verantwortlichen Politikern vor, sie handelten „weitgehend visionslos“. Dabei hat die PISA-Studie durchaus eine Reihe von Aktivitäten in deutschen Landen ausgelöst. Seine Kritik kann somit nur bedeuten, dass solche Aktivitäten ohne ein grundlegend richtungsänderndes Konzept erfolgen. Solche Befürchtungen hatte der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen beim Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend bereits 2002 geäußert: „Die öffentliche Debatte über die Folgerungen, die aus den Ergebnissen der PISA-Studie zu ziehen sind, lässt nach Auffassung des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats für Familienfragen zentrale Erkenntnisse der PISA-Studie außer acht, ... diese Debatte bezieht sich fast ausschließlich darauf, wie schulisches Lernen besser zu organisieren und Lerninhalte und Leistungsstandards zu vereinheitlichen seien. Die PISA-Studie belegt jedoch in Übereinstimmung mit den Befunden früherer wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen, dass die grundlegenden Fähigkeiten und Bereitschaften für schulische Lern- und lebenslange Bildungsprozesse der nachwachsenden Generation in den Familien geschaffen werden. Die Familie muss daher als die grundlegende Bildungsinstitution der Kinder und Jugendlichen anerkannt werden“( Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 2002, 9). In der politischen Szene gab es bislang keine nennenswerte Reaktion auf dieses Votum. Die konkrete Entwicklung bestätigte die vorweg von Experten geäußerte Befürchtung: Die Schulbürokratie übernahm es zu definieren, was (ihr) an Reformen notwendig zu sein schien. Familienpolitische Komponenten sind dabei nicht zu erkennen. In diesem Beitrag wird deshalb die Einbeziehung der Familien und ihres Leistungspotenzials in die schulpolitische Argumentation gefordert. Verlangt wird eine bildungspolitische Debatte, die die Familie als Bildungsinstitution respektiert und den Erfolg von Schule daran misst, inwieweit diese in der Lage ist, das familiale Handlungspotenzial zu stärken. Dies gilt vornehmlich für „die grundlegenden Fähigkeiten und Bereitschaften für schulische Lern- und lebenslange Bildungsprozesse der nachwachsenden Generation“, wenngleich nicht allein für diese. Es muss von allen Akteuren erkannt und anerkannt werden, dass das Postulat des Familienbezugs bildungspolitischer Reformen die aktuelle Debatte um eine „visionäre“ Perspektive anreichert, die die Vorstellungen über die Richtung, in die sich Reformschritte erstrecken sollen, grundlegend ändert. Erste Denkanstöße bezüglich der Dringlichkeit eines Perspektivenwandels lieferte der Fünfte Familienbericht (1994), der Bildung und Ausbildung unter dem Aspekt des Aufbaus und der Erhaltung von Humanvermögen analysierte. Dieser Linie folgten verschiedene Voten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats für Familienfragen, nicht zuletzt das bereits genannte Gutachten zur PISA-Studie, aber auch die sozialen und wissenschaftlichen Orientierungen Heinz Lamperts (siehe vor allem dessen umfassendes Plädoyer für eine rationale Familienpolitik 1996). An diese Vorgaben knüpft der folgende Beitrag an. Er mahnt die Aufnahme der hier sichtbar werdenden familienorientierten Perspektive in die Politikdebatte über das Schulwesen an. Insbesonders erinnert er daran, dass eine wissenschaftlich fundierte Reformdiskussion vor jeglicher Maßnahmendebatte eine Klarstellung dessen verlangt, wo die konkreten Defizite des zu revidierenden Systems zu suchen sind und welche Reformziele verfolgt werden sollen. Es ist unabdingbar, sich dessen weitaus deutlicher als bisher zu vergewissern, dass die Familie als Bildungsinstitution die Voraussetzungen für den Erfolg aller folgenden Bildungsprozesse schafft, dass Bildung ein Kernelement einer demokratischen Gesellschaft ist und zugleich ein Garant für die Zukunftsfähigkeit einer solchen Gesellschaft. Vielleicht ist damit schon das wirklich Visionäre der Betrachtungsweise benannt, für die hier geworben werden soll. Aber es soll auch darauf verwiesen werden, dass ein Schulsystem schon allein deshalb zu kritisieren ist, wenn es sich nahezu jeglicher gesellschaftlichen Kontrolle entzieht. Auf welch relativ einfache, einsichtige Weise demokratischere Kontrollmöglichkeiten für das Schulsystem geschaffen werden könnten, wenn es ernsthaft gewollt würde, auf die Beantwortung dieser Frage werden die weiteren Erörterungen dieses Beitrags ausgerichtet sein. Das Ergebnis dieser Betrachtungen ist eine klare Empfehlung. Deren Motto lautet: Allen Eltern sollten durch die Schaffung eines Instruments, das ich „Anteilsrechte am Schulbudget“ nennen möchte, eigenständige Kontrollund Verfügungsrechte im Bildungssystem eingeräumt werden. Gemeint sind Kontrollrechte, zunächst von Eltern, im Hinblick auf eine gesellschaftlich verantwortete schulische Leistungserfüllung. Dass

Suggested Citation

  • Hans-Günter Krüsselberg, 2005. "Milton Friedman und der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen Elternkompetenz und Anteilscheine am Schulbudget – Gedanken über Reformpotenziale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200506, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:volksw:200506
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