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An Optional European Contract Law Code: Advantages and Disadvantages

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  • Wolfgang Kerber

    () (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

Abstract

Should the EU introduce an Optional European Contract Law Code and what should it look like? By applying economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition (legal federalism), it is shown why an Optional Code would be a very suitable legal instrument within a two-level European System of Contract Laws. By allowing private parties choice of law to a certain extent, it can combine the most important advantages of centralisation and decentralisation of competences for legal rules. Through differentiated analyses of three kinds of contract law rules (mandatory substantive rules, mandatory information rules and facilitative law), important conclusions can be reached: which kinds of contract law rules are most suitable to be applied on an optional basis (e.g. facilitative law) and which might be less so (e.g. information regulations). Furthermore a number of additional general conclusions about the design and scope of an Optional EU Code and some conclusions in regard to sales law are derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "An Optional European Contract Law Code: Advantages and Disadvantages," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200607, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:volksw:200607
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    File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/artikel/2006-07_Kerber-Grundmann.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lars P. Feld & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Mehr-Ebenen Jurisdiktionssysteme: Zur variablen Architektur von Integration," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200605, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    2. Wolfgang Kerber & Julia Wendel, 2016. "Regulatory Networks, Legal Federalism, and Multi-level Regulatory Systems," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201613, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Kanning, Arnald J., 2008. "Harmonization of private law on a global level," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 256-262, December.
    4. Wolfgang Kerber & Julia Wendel, 2014. "Regulation of Network Sectors in the EU: A Federalist Perspective," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201422, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Wolfgang Kerber & Roger Van den Bergh, 2008. "Mutual Recognition Revisited: Misunderstandings, Inconsistencies, and a Suggested Reinterpretation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 447-465, August.
    6. Fernando Gomez & Juan Ganuza, 2012. "How to build European private law: an economic analysis of the lawmaking and harmonization dimensions in European private law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 481-503, June.
    7. Hans-Günter Krüsselberg, 2005. "Milton Friedman und der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen Elternkompetenz und Anteilscheine am Schulbudget – Gedanken über Reformpotenziale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200506, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contract law; European Union; legal federalism; regulatory competition;

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law

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