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Evolutionary approaches to legal change

  • Eckardt, Martina

Institutions matter both for long-term economic evolution as well as for more short-termed economic performance. The law is particularly important in shaping the institutional framework for economic activities. This paper gives an overview of typical evolutionary explanations of legal change, i.e. the generation and dissemination of legal innovations over time. The main actors, the key determinants, and the central mechanisms are identified. In addition to approaches which deal primarily with statutory respectively judge-made legal change, the concept of legal paradigms and path dependence, the co-evolution of law and technology and the impact of institutional competition on legal change are discussed.

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Paper provided by University of Rostock, Institute of Economics in its series Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory with number 47.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:roswps:47
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