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Anomalies in Political Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Frey, Bruno S
  • Eichenberger, Reiner

Abstract

Results in cognitive psychology and experimental economics indicate that under identifiable conditions individuals do not act in an economically rational way. These results are important for political economy. Anomalies appear in the behavior of voters, politicians, and administrators. Economic markets do not fully eliminate anomalies in the aggregation process. It is shown that political aggregation by democracy, bargaining, or bureaucracy may weaken or strengthen such individual anomalies. Moreover, institutions can partially be interpreted as endogenously emerging as a result of individuals' demands to cope with anomalies. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Frey, Bruno S & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1991. "Anomalies in Political Economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 71-89, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:68:y:1991:i:1-3:p:71-89
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    Cited by:

    1. Eckardt, Martina, 2004. "Evolutionary approaches to legal change," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 47, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    2. Bischoff, Ivo & Meckl, Jürgen, 2008. "Endowment effect theory, public goods and welfare," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1768-1774, October.
    3. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    4. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    5. Michael Grillo & Miguel Teixeira & David Wilson, 2010. "Residential Satisfaction and Civic Engagement: Understanding the Causes of Community Participation," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 451-466, July.
    6. Ivo Bischoff, 2008. "Endowment effect theory, prediction bias and publicly provided goods: an experimental study," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(3), pages 283-296, March.
    7. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1991. "Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme: Analytische Konzepte und institutionelle Lösungen am Beispiel der Zusammenarbeit zwischen zwei Bundesländern," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    8. Jan Schnellenbach, 2016. "A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 135-156, February.
    9. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, "undated". "Two Concerns about Rational Choice: Indoctrination and Imperialism," IEW - Working Papers 104, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    10. Oleg Smirnov, 2009. "Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 277-290, December.
    11. Ashworth, John & Heyndels, Bruno & Smolders, Carine, 2003. "Psychological taxing in Flemish municipalities," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 741-762, December.
    12. Schuett, Florian & Wagner, Alexander K., 2011. "Hindsight-biased evaluation of political decision makers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1621-1634.
    13. Asmus Olsen, 2013. "The politics of digits: evidence of odd taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 59-73, January.
    14. Levy, Raphaël, 2014. "Soothing politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 126-133.

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