IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Взаимодействие Государственных И Частных Структур В Интеграционных Группировах: Теоретические Подходы И Опыт Снг
[Interaction of Public and Private Actors in Regional Integration Groups - Theoretical Approaches and Experience of the CIS]

  • Libman, Alexander
Registered author(s):

    The paper discusses the influence of processes of regional economic integration on the interaction of the government and private agents. It shows that specifics of the integration model influences the transformation of government-business relations by intensifying the interjurisdictional competition, and also discusses the consequences of this transformation for development of economic institutions. This approach is used to study th formal and informal integration in the post-Soviet space.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17044/1/MPRA_paper_17044.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17044.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17044
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
    Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
    Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
    Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Joeri Gorter & Ruud de Mooij, 2001. "Capital income taxation in Europe; trends and trade-offs," CPB Special Publication 30, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    2. Forslid, Rikard & Andersson, Fredrik, 1999. "Tax Competition and Economic Geography," Research Papers in Economics 2000:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    3. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1999. "Regieren in Europa: Effektiv und demokratisch?," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 0, number sbd-1999.
    4. John P. Conley & Antonio Rangel, 2001. "Intergenerational Fiscal Constitutions: How to Protect Future Generations Using Land Taxes and Federalism," NBER Working Papers 8394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2003. "Die Rolle des Staates in privaten Governance Strukturen," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003 2003-11, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    6. Feld, Lars P., 2000. "Steuerwettbewerb und seine Auswirkungen auf Allokation und Distribution," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 10, number urn:isbn:9783161473852.
    7. Devereux, Michael P. & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3400, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2001. "The New Systems Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 623, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Eggert, Wolfgang, 2001. "Capital tax competition with socially wasteful government consumption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 517-529, September.
    10. Kathrin Isele, 2003. "Fusionskontrolle im Standortwettbewerb," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 51, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    11. Krieger-Boden, Christiane, 2002. "European integration and the case for compensatory regional policy," ERSA conference papers ersa02p240, European Regional Science Association.
    12. Wilson, John Douglas & Janeba, Eckhard, 2005. "Decentralization and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1211-1229, July.
    13. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2004. "Inequality and Institutions," Research Department Publications 4361, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    14. Bouwen, Pieter, 2003. "A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 7, December.
    15. Roger Myerson & Serguey Braguinsky, 2005. "Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment," 2005 Meeting Papers 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Giovannini, Alberto & Hines Jr, James R, 1990. "Capital Flight and Tax Competition: Are there Viable Solutions to Both Problems," CEPR Discussion Papers 416, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2002. "Why Europe Should Love Tax Competition - and the U.S. Even More So," NBER Working Papers 9334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Signe Krogstrup, 2002. "What do Theories of Tax Competition Predict for Capital Taxes in EU Countries? A Review of the Tax Competition Literature," IHEID Working Papers 05-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    19. Eckhard Janeba & John Douglas Wilson, 1999. "Tax Competition and Trade Protection," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(3/4), pages 459-, July.
    20. Kokovin Sergey, 2000. "Investment-Curve Model of Tax Optimization and Tax Competition," EERC Working Paper Series 98-242e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    21. Kokovin Sergey & Zhelobodko Evgeniy, 2004. "Leviathanian Fiscal Competition in Heterogeneous Country," EERC Working Paper Series 01-219e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    22. Signe Krogstrup, 2003. "Are Capital Taxes Racing to the Bottom in the European Union?," IHEID Working Papers 01-2003, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    23. Janeba, Eckhard, 1998. "Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 135-153, February.
    24. Clinton R. Shiells & John Dodsworth & Paul Henri Mathieu, 2002. "Cross-Border Issues in Energy Trade in the CIS Countries," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 02/13, International Monetary Fund.
    25. Bucar, Branko & Glas, Miroslav & Hisrich, Robert D., 2003. "Ethics and entrepreneurs: An international comparative study," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 261-281, March.
    26. Feld, Lars P, 2000. " Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 125-64, October.
    27. Leonid Polishchuk & Alexei Savvateev, 2004. "Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 12(1), pages 103-127, 03.
    28. André Fourçans & Thierry Warin, 2001. "Tax Harmonization versus Tax Competition in Europe: A Game Theoretical Approach," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 132, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
    29. Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, 2002. "European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-71, January.
    30. Wrede, Matthias, 2001. "Yardstick competition to tame the Leviathan," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 705-721, November.
    31. Ruta, Michele, 2003. "The allocation of competencies in an international union: a positive analysis," Working Paper Series 0220, European Central Bank.
    32. Siebert, Horst, 2000. "Zum Paradigma des Standortwettbewerbs," Beiträge zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, number urn:isbn:9783161473845.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17044. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.