IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eer/wpalle/01-219e.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Leviathanian Fiscal Competition in Heterogeneous Country

Author

Listed:
  • Kokovin Sergey
  • Zhelobodko Evgeniy

Abstract

In this normative study of fiscal competition mechanism, we allow for various schemes of taxation, various mobility of tax-base, non-identical regions, and nonbenevolent governments. We examine the fundamental trade-o® between “negative externalities” of the competition and benefits from its budget discipline. Some indicators of regional “rivalry” and “non-benevolence” are constructed for diagnosing marginal “over-taxing” in any region. It enables also “in-large” comparison of fiscal regimes. Under some restrictions on the country’s heterogeneity in tax rates, marginal “over-taxing” at competition signifies that switching to certain sort of tax co-ordination would deteriorate welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Kokovin Sergey & Zhelobodko Evgeniy, 2004. "Leviathanian Fiscal Competition in Heterogeneous Country," EERC Working Paper Series 01-219e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    • Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:01-219e
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/127d6be18c1f68d3bd47f79d0bfdf3e389574683.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
    2. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773.
    3. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    4. Keen, Michael & Marchand, Maurice, 1997. "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-53, October.
    5. George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, 2019. "Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: George R Zodrow (ed.), TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE Selected Essays of George R. Zodrow, chapter 17, pages 525-542, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    7. Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-875, September.
    8. Peter Birch Sørensen, 2000. "The case for international tax co-ordination reconsidered," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 430-472.
    9. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Libman, Alexander, 2005. "Взаимодействие Государственных И Частных Структур В Интеграционных Группировах: Теоретические Подходы И Опыт Снг [Interaction of Public and Private Actors in Regional Integration Groups - Theoretic," MPRA Paper 17044, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
    2. Zodrow, George R, 2003. "Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(6), pages 651-671, November.
    3. Boadway, Robin & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2012. "Reassessment of the Tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1063-1078.
    4. Gaëtan Nicodème, 2006. "Corporate tax competition and coordination in the European Union: What do we know? Where do we stand?," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 250, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    5. Parry, Ian W. H., 2003. "How large are the welfare costs of tax competition?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 39-60, July.
    6. Krishanu Karmakar & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2014. "Fiscal Competition versus Fiscal Harmonization: A Review of the Arguments," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1431, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    7. Ricardo Varsano & Sergio Guimarães Ferreira & José Roberto Afonso, 2015. "Fiscal Competition: a Bird's Eye View," Discussion Papers 0114, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
    8. Dickescheid, Thomas, 2002. "Steuerwettbewerb und Direktinvestitionen," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 16, number urn:isbn:9783161477348, December.
    9. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    10. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve & Wilson, John D., 2010. "Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 249-259, March.
    11. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation," Economic Research Papers 269630, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    12. Lars Feld, 2014. "James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-252, September.
    13. Verdier, Thierry & Silve, Arthur, 2023. "The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-seeking Elites," CEPR Discussion Papers 18165, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Wilson, John Douglas, 2005. "Welfare-improving competition for mobile capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-18, January.
    15. Leonzio Rizzo, 2006. "Le inefficienze della competizione fiscale: una rassegna dei principali modelli teorici," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 89-120.
    16. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2013. "The economics and empirics of tax competition: A survey," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 163, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    17. James Alm & H. Spencer Banzhaf, 2012. "Designing Economic Instruments For The Environment In A Decentralized Fiscal System," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 177-202, April.
    18. Hans Pitlik, 2005. "Folgt die Steuerpolitik in der EU der Logik des Steuerwettbewerbs," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 256/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
    19. Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2002. "Why Europe Should Love Tax Competition - and the U.S. Even More So," NBER Working Papers 9334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Jia, Junxue & Guo, Qingwang & Zhang, Jing, 2014. "Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 107-122.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:01-219e. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Anton Pashchenko (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.eercnetwork.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.