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Theories of Tax Competition

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  • Wilson, John Douglas

Abstract

A central message of the tax competition literature is that independent governments engage in wasteful competition for scarce capital through reductions in tax rates and public expenditure levels. This paper discusses many of the contributions to this literature, ranging from early demonstrations of wasteful tax competition to more recent contributions that identify efficiency-enhancing roles for competition among governments. Such roles involve considerations not present in earlier models, including imperfectly-competitive market structures, government commitment problems, and political economy considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:52:y:1999:i:2:p:269-304
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon, Roger H & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1996. "Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally? Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1057-1075, December.
    2. Dhillon, Amrita & Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley A., 1999. "Implementing tax coordination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 243-268, May.
    3. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
    4. Bucovetsky, S., 1995. "Rent seeking and tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 337-363, November.
    5. Gordon, Roger H, 1986. "Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1086-1102, December.
    6. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
    7. Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A., 1996. "Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-53, January.
    8. Hoyt, William H. & Jensen, Richard A., 1996. "Precommitment in a system of hierarchical governments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 481-504, August.
    9. Lee, Kangoh, 1997. "Tax Competition with Imperfectly Mobile Capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 222-242, September.
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