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Globalization and tax policy

  • Neumann, Rebecca
  • Holman, Jill
  • Alm, James

Globalization is thought to reduce the ability of governments to collect taxes. If labor and capital can move between jurisdictions, then attempts to tax these factors will lead to a "vanishing taxpayer" as factors flee from high- to low-tax regions. More broadly, globalization suggests that there will be some convergence in tax rates across countries. This paper questions this view by examining the impact of globalization on taxation using a two-country, two-factor, two-good model. In particular, we ask how globalization, measured by increased international factor mobility, affects the ability of governments to tax factors. Our quantitative analysis indicates that, while increased mobility reduces revenues to some extent, governments still retain significant ability to collect taxes.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal The North American Journal of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 20 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 193-211

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:20:y:2009:i:2:p:193-211
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620163

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