Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries
This paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world of integrated markets sovereign national governments. Taxation of mobile capital and immobile labor in order to finance a public good generates inefficient fiscal competition. Two fiscal reforms are considered: a minimum capital tax level and a tax range, i.e., a minimum plus a maximum capital tax level. We show that the introduction of a lower bound to the capital tax level is never preferred to fiscal competition by all countries while there always exists a combination of both a lower and an upper bound which is unanimously accepted.
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Volume (Year): 36 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 708-726
| Handle: | RePEc:eee:regeco:v:36:y:2006:i:6:p:708-726 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/regec
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