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Intergenerational Fiscal Constitutions: How to Protect Future Generations Using Land Taxes and Federalism

Author

Listed:
  • John Conley

    () (University of Illiniois)

  • Antonio Rangel

    () (Standford Univerisity and NBER)

Abstract

This paper studies how to design a fiscal constitution that protects future generations from expropriation and generates optimal investment in intergenerational public goods. We study how to accomplish these goals by changing the level of government to which different types of intergenerational public goods are assigned, and the tax base of the different jurisdictions. We show that land taxation is the essential instrument for policies that mostly generate fiscal spillovers, such as debt and public infrastructure. By contrast, interjurisdictional competition is required for policies that mostly generate direct spillovers, such as irreversible environmental damages. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to design a fiscal constitution that generates full capitalization of fiscal spillovers, but in general, not one that generates full capitalization of direct spillovers.

Suggested Citation

  • John Conley & Antonio Rangel, 2001. "Intergenerational Fiscal Constitutions: How to Protect Future Generations Using Land Taxes and Federalism," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(17), pages 1.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01aa0021
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper, 1981. "Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 141-178, January.
    2. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 1121-1166.
    3. Boldrin, Michele & Montes Alonso, Ana, 1998. "Intergenerational transfer institutions public education and public pensions," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6148, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paul R. Bergin & Reuven Glick, 2003. "Endogenous Tradability and Macroeconomic Implications," NBER Working Papers 9739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Holger Sieg & Daniele Coen-Pirani & Jeffrey Brinkman, 2015. "The Political Economy of Underfunded Municipal Pension Plans," 2015 Meeting Papers 345, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Hilber, Christian A.L. & Mayer, Christopher, 2009. "Why do households without children support local public schools? Linking house price capitalization to school spending," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 74-90, January.
    4. Hilber, Christian A.L., 2010. "New housing supply and the dilution of social capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, pages 419-437.
    5. Marco Bassetto, 2008. "Public investment and budget rules for state vs. local governments," Working Paper Series WP-08-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    6. Reuven Glick & Paul Bergin, 2004. "Productivity and Tradability," 2004 Meeting Papers 327, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Marco Bassetto, 2009. "The Research Agenda: Marco Bassetto on the Quantitative Evaluation of Fiscal Policy Rules," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), April.
    8. Libman, Alexander, 2005. "Взаимодействие Государственных И Частных Структур В Интеграционных Группировах: Теоретические Подходы И Опыт Снг
      [Interaction of Public and Private Actors in Regional Integration Groups - Theoretic
      ," MPRA Paper 17044, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics

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