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Capital Flight And Tax Competition: Are There Viable Solutions To Both Problems?

Author

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  • GIOVANNINI, A.
  • HINES, J.R.J.

Abstract

This paper discusses a model corporate tax system based on the application of the residence principle. This tax system, while preserving national sovereignties, minimizes the distortions arising from international capital mobility. The paper is motivated by an analysis of European capital income tax systems, and of the distortions that might arise as obstacles to international capital flows diminish. The alternative system that we analyse has two main properties: it exploits the territoriality of law enforcement, and it allows countries to set the corporate tax rate -- and the extent of double taxation of corporate income -- independently.
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Suggested Citation

  • Giovannini, A. & Hines, J.R.J., 1990. "Capital Flight And Tax Competition: Are There Viable Solutions To Both Problems?," Papers 51, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:priwdp:51
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniele Checchi, 1992. "Capital controls and distribution of income: Empirical evidence for Great Britain Japan and Australia," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 128(3), pages 558-587, September.
    2. Siebert, Horst & Koop, Michael J., 1990. "Institutional competition: a concept for Europe?," Kiel Working Papers 440, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    3. Roger H. Gordon, 1992. "Canada-U.S. Free Trade and Pressures for Tax Coordination," NBER Chapters, in: Canada-U.S. Tax Comparisons, pages 75-96, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gordon, R.H., 1990. "Canada-U.S. Free Trade And Pressures For Tax Harmonization," Working Papers 260, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    5. Marcel Gérard, 2002. "Tax Competition, the Distribution of MNE's Ownership and the Wage Formation Process," CESifo Working Paper Series 631, CESifo.
    6. Enrique G. Mendoza & Linda L. Tesar, 2003. "Winners and Losers of Tax Competition in the European Union," NBER Working Papers 10051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Marcel Gérard, 1999. "L’imposition des revenus de l’investissement en Europe, une hétérogénéité coûteuse," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 401-426.
    8. Hines, J.R., 1990. "The Transfer Pricing Problem: Where The Profit Are," Papers 64, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
    9. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701.
    10. Killian J. McCarthy & Frederik van Doorn & Brigitte Unger, 2011. "Tax Competition and the Harmonisation of Corporate Tax Rates in Europe," Chapters, in: Miroslav N. Jovanović (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Integration, Volume II, chapter 20, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Gordon, Roger H, 1992. "Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1159-1180, July.
    12. Miroslav N. Jovanović (ed.), 2011. "International Handbook on the Economics of Integration, Volume II," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14136.
    13. Libman, Alexander, 2005. "Взаимодействие Государственных И Частных Структур В Интеграционных Группировах: Теоретические Подходы И Опыт Снг [Interaction of Public and Private Actors in Regional Integration Groups - Theoretical Approaches and Experience of the CIS]," MPRA Paper 17044, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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