Democracy and FDI
Many believe that multinational enterprises insensitively ignore political rights and civil liberties in the countries of their investments. Frequently, non-governmental organisations accuse multinationals of fostering repressive regimes in developing countries and consider foreign direct investment (FDI) as a tool of exploitation. This paper tries to examine empirically the complex relationship between democracy and FDI in a systematic way, using cross-sectional and panel data analysis. The results indicate that – on average – investments by multinationals are significantly higher in democratic countries, thereby refuting the hypothesis that political repression fosters FDI. Yet this positive link does not hold for the 1970s, when a considerable share of FDI flowed to countries with repressive regimes.
|Date of creation:||2003|
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Web page: http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/20
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