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Economic Leverage and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

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  • Kimberly Ann Elliott

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

Almost a decade ago, as the last nuclear crisis with North Korea was reaching a peak, I concluded the following about the potential utility of economic sanctions: The debate over US policy toward North Korea boils down to one deceptively simple question: what does Kim Il-sung want? No one can be sure of the answer and different interpretations have quite different policy implications. If the Great Leader views a nuclear weapons option as important to the survival of his regime, economic sanctions are unlikely to force him to give it up. But if he views the threat of developing nuclear weapons as a bargain-ing chip, some combination of carrots and sticks may induce him to trade it away.

Suggested Citation

  • Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2003. "Economic Leverage and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Policy Briefs PB03-03, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb03-03
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    File URL: https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/economic-leverage-and-north-korean-nuclear-crisis
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, October.
    2. Marcus Noland, 2000. "Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 94, October.
    3. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, January.
    4. Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland, 2007. "North Korea's External Economic Relations," Working Paper Series WP07-7, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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