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Ending Economic Sanctions

Author

Listed:
  • Han Dorussen

    (Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

  • Jongryn Mo

    (Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University-Seoul)

Abstract

Little attention has been paid to how and when economic sanctions end, especially compared with the amount of research on their effectiveness. A game in which the ending of sanctions is part of interstate bargaining about a contested policy is analyzed. In case of audience costs, sanctions may occur because governments use strategies that commit them to their ideal policy position. Governments use as constraints domestic political groups that have an interest in the disputed policy. Alternatively, rent-seeking enables governments to obtain political gain from the opportunities for side payments provided by sanctions. Results show that commitment strategies help states improve their bargaining position and make the resolution of the conflict more difficult. Data on the duration and ending of sanctions initiated in the period between 1914 and 1990 are used to test these hypotheses. The analyses provide clear evidence that commitment strategies affect the duration of sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Han Dorussen & Jongryn Mo, 2001. "Ending Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(4), pages 395-426, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:45:y:2001:i:4:p:395-426
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045004001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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