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Die Rolle des Staates in privaten Governance Strukturen

  • Lars P. Feld
  • Gebhard Kirchgässner

We first give a brief sketch of the economic tasks the government has to perform, before three issues are discussed in more detail: public production, competition policy, and government interventions in Corporate Governance. These three issues are of particular political relevance in Switzerland, partly because the Swiss citizens clearly expressed in referenda that they prefer a larger role of the government in these areas than most economists recommend. Finally, we discuss two developments which have shifted the perspective by which the role of the government is viewed: the increasing internationalisation of economic policy and the role of intermediary institutions between the state and the market.

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Article provided by Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES) in its journal Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): 139 (2003)
Issue (Month): III (September)
Pages: 253-285

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Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2003-iii-1
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