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Rent seeking and the economics of corruption

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  • Toke S. Aidt

    (University of Cambridge)

Abstract

The paper studies the influence of Tullock (West Econ J 5:224–232, 1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Toke S. Aidt, 2016. "Rent seeking and the economics of corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 142-157, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:27:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-016-9215-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9215-9
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    4. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
    6. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Francisco González-Gómez & Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, 2017. "Weakening political connections by means of regulatory reform: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 211-235, October.
    7. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Academic exclusion: some experiences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 1-20, April.
    8. Richters, Oliver & Siemoneit, Andreas, 2017. "Fear of stagnation? A review on growth imperatives," VÖÖ Discussion Papers 6/2017, Vereinigung für Ökologische Ökonomie e.V. (VÖÖ).
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    10. Randall G. Holcombe, 2018. "Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Economies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(4), pages 1-12, October.
    11. Mihály Fazekas & Johannes Wachs, 2020. "Corruption and the Network Structure of Public Contracting Markets across Government Change," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(2), pages 153-166.
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    13. Biró, Flóra Panna & Márkus, Ádám & Erdey, László, 2016. "A kormányzás hatása a közvetlen külföldi tőkebefektetésekre Latin-Amerikában," MPRA Paper 80025, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Rajeev K. Goel & Ummad Mazhar & James W. Saunoris, 2018. "Market Contestability and Bribe Solicitations: Evidence Across Stages of Firms' Operations," CESifo Working Paper Series 6981, CESifo.
    15. Mocetti, Sauro & Orlando, Tommaso, 2019. "Corruption, workforce selection and mismatch in the public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    16. Kouramoudou Kéïta & Hannu Laurila, 2021. "Corruption and Tax Burden: What Is the Joint Effect on Total Factor Productivity?," Economies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(1), pages 1-16, March.
    17. Capasso, Salvatore & Santoro, Lodovico, 2018. "Active and passive corruption: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 103-119.
    18. Randall G. Holcombe, 2017. "Political incentives for rent creation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 62-78, March.
    19. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Adam C. Smith & Russell S. Sobel, 2019. "Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 211-234, June.
    20. Dennis Coates & Iuliia Naidenova & Petr Parshakov, 2019. "Determinants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 438-466, December.
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    22. Aidt, Toke S. & Hillman, Arye L. & Qijun, LIU, 2020. "Who takes bribes and how much? Evidence from the China Corruption Conviction Databank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    23. Kalyuzhnova, Yelena & Belitski, Maksim, 2019. "The impact of corruption and local content policy in on firm performance: Evidence from Kazakhstan," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 67-76.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent seeking; Corruption; Bribes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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