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Eight Questions about Corruption

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  • Jakob Svensson

Abstract

This paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption: (1) What is corruption? (2) Which countries are the most corrupt? (3) What are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption? (4) What is the magnitude of corruption? (5) Do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption? (6) Can competition reduce corruption? (7) Why have there been so few (recent) successful attempts to fight corruption? (8) Does corruption adversely affect growth?

Suggested Citation

  • Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:19:y:2005:i:3:p:19-42 Note: DOI: 10.1257/089533005774357860
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