IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v79y1994i1-2p149-60.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rent Seeking and the Welfare Cost of Trade Barriers

Author

Listed:
  • Lopez, Rigoberto A
  • Pagoulatos, Emilio

Abstract

This paper estimates the potential social cost of trade barriers using the Harberger and the Tullock/Posner approaches for a sample of U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing industries. In addition, it tests the relationship between the computed welfare losses and special-interest political activity (PAC contributions). If all rents were dissipated through rent seeking, the social cost of trade barriers would be about 12.5 percent of domestic consumption and would be particularly large for sugar and milk products where quotas are the main instrument of protection. Furthermore, the results indicate that welfare losses are positively associated with industry lobbying but the strength of such association is strongly dependent on industry concentration. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Lopez, Rigoberto A & Pagoulatos, Emilio, 1994. "Rent Seeking and the Welfare Cost of Trade Barriers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 149-160, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:79:y:1994:i:1-2:p:149-60
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ivan Slobozhan & Peter Ormosi & Rajesh Sharma, 2020. "Which bills are lobbied? Predicting and interpreting lobbying activity in the US," Papers 2005.06386, arXiv.org.
    2. Lopez, Rigoberto A. & Hathie, Ibrahima, 2002. "Testing Protection For Sale In The Food Industries," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19682, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Angelos Angelopoulos & Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Spyridon Lazarakis & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2019. "The Distributional Consequences of Rent Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series 7835, CESifo.
    4. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    5. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Adam C. Smith & Russell S. Sobel, 2019. "Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 211-234, June.
    6. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    7. Ivan Slobozhan & Peter Ormosi & Rajesh Sharma, 2020. "Which bills are lobbied? Predicting and interpreting lobbying activity in the US," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2020-03, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    8. Toke S. Aidt, 2016. "Rent seeking and the economics of corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 142-157, June.
    9. Ana Rodríguez-Álvarez & Ignacio Rosal & José Baños-Pino, 2007. "The cost of strikes in the Spanish mining sector: modelling an undesirable input with a distance function," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 73-83, February.
    10. Sanjib Bhuyan, 2000. "Corporate Political Activities and Oligopoly Welfare Loss," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 17(4), pages 411-426, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:79:y:1994:i:1-2:p:149-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.