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Rent Seeking at the Margin? Theory and Evidence from Unesco’s World Heritage List

Author

Listed:
  • Martina Dattilo

    (University of Turin, Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis”, Italy)

  • FABIO PADOVANO

    (Université Rennes 1, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, Rennes, France; and DSP, Università Roma Tre, Rome Italy)

  • YVON ROCABOY

    (Université Rennes 1, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, Rennes, France)

Abstract

We analyze, both theoretically and empirically, how rent seekers allocate resources between alternative rents in the context of UNESCO’s World Heritage List (WHL). The stylized model features representatives of member countries who lobby UNESCO to include national sites in the WHL. Sites can be of either high or low quality, depending on whether their renown alone guarantees enlisting or lobbying is necessary. The increase in tourism generated by enlisting measures the value of the rent, which is greater for sites of lower quality. The cost of rent seeking corresponds to the financial resources spent and the loss of reputation that the representative suffers when he/she supports low quality sites. Given UNESCO’s institutional structure, this loss is higher when the representative acts in the World Heritage Committee, which gives him/her greater visibility. The model predicts that the representative promotes high quality sites when he/she sits in the committee, to increase his/her reputation, and lobbies for low quality sites when he/she is not a member, using the country’s financial resources. The estimates uncover a rich pattern of rent seeking strategies: member countries usually regularize their budgetary position before they propose lower quality sites and support high quality ones when they sit in the committee. This confirms that rent seeking is conducted at the margin.

Suggested Citation

  • Martina Dattilo & FABIO PADOVANO & YVON ROCABOY, 2025. "Rent Seeking at the Margin? Theory and Evidence from Unesco’s World Heritage List," Working papers 119, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
  • Handle: RePEc:ipu:wpaper:119
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Bruno S. Frey & Paolo Pamini & Lasse Steiner, 2011. "What Determines The World Heritage List? An Econometric Analysis," CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-01, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent-seeking at the margin; UNESCO World Heritage List; international organizations; measurement of quality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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