On Rent Seeking and Inclusiveness
Using an extension of a standard rent-seeking model, this paper shows that "inclusiveness", as defined and measured in the text, is the property of a political system that motivates government to deter destructive rent seeking. Highly-inclusive polities are likely to be democracies since dictatorships lack a key prerequisite for inclusiveness. However, democracies are not necessarily highly inclusive.
|Date of creation:||26 Aug 2009|
|Date of revision:||18 Apr 2013|
|Publication status:||Published: Carleton Economic Papers|
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