Efficient mercantilism? Revenue-maximizing monopoly policies as Ramsey taxation
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More about this item
KeywordsMercantilism Rent seeking Endogenous rent seeking Rent extraction Leviathan Corruption Anti-trust Dictatorship Regulation Public choice Innovation Patents Interest groups Encompassing interest Monopoly Public finance;
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