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Socio-political conflict, social distance, and rent extraction in historical perspective

  • Thaize Challier, M.-Christine
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    This paper uses French historical data covering four centuries to investigate how social distance, rent extraction, and pressure for reforms affect socio-political conflict. Social distance in itself does not systematically lead to socio-political conflict. Robust evidence is presented indicating that discretionary taxation spurs political violence more so than discretionary public spending. A peaceful rather than confrontational period is conducive for implementing reforms to enhance local democracy and reduce social inequality sought by ordinary inhabitants.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176-2680(09)00071-8
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 51-67

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:51-67
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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