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Are the Rich Too Rich to be Expropriated?: Economic Power and the Feasibility of Constitutional Limits to Redistribution

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  • Breyer, Friedrich
  • Ursprung, Heinrich W

Abstract

Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper the authors analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. They demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e., the above-average income earners, are indeed in a position to bribe the small segment of the voters with incomes between the median and the mean to resist the temptation of supporting confiscatory taxation. This is true even if compensation payments in cash are politically unfeasible and therefore need to be made in terms of an evenly distributed private good; and it may even be true if only pure public goods are available to swing the middle class. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Breyer, Friedrich & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1998. "Are the Rich Too Rich to be Expropriated?: Economic Power and the Feasibility of Constitutional Limits to Redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 135-156, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:1-2:p:135-56
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    Cited by:

    1. Danziger, Leif & Ursprung, Heinrich W., 2001. "Risk aversion and social mobility: the implausibility of order-preserving income redistributions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 9-13, December.
    2. Leif Danziger & Heinrich Ursprung, 2000. "Risk-Aversion and Social Mobility: The Impossibility of Order-Preserving Income Redistributions," CESifo Working Paper Series 321, CESifo.
    3. Hefeker Carsten & Potrafke Niklas, 2021. "Heinrich W. Ursprung – Herausragender Ökonom, Mentor und Ratgeber," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 22(4), pages 370-374, November.
    4. Arye L. Hillman, 2021. "Heinrich Ursprung: a scholarly life," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 305-312, December.
    5. Aidt, T. & Jensen, P.S., 2007. "The Taxman Tools Up: An Event History Study of the Introduction of the Personal Income Tax in Western Europe, 1815-1941," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0766, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Thomas Goda & Santiago Sanchez, 2018. "Market and Disposable Top Income Shares adjusted by National Accounts Data," Journal of Income Distribution, Ad libros publications inc., vol. 26(2), pages 1-22, July.
    7. Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2003. "Eating the Rich vs. Feeding the Poor: Borrowing Constraints and the Reluctance to Redistribute," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 351-366, September.
    8. Pfarr, Christian, 2012. "Meltzer-Richard and social mobility hypothesis: revisiting the income-redistribution nexus using German choice data," MPRA Paper 43325, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie, 2018. "Upward Income Mobility and Legislator Support for Education Policies," IZA Discussion Papers 11324, IZA Network @ LISER.
    10. Salmai Qari & Kai Konrad & Benny Geys, 2012. "Patriotism, taxation and international mobility," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 695-717, June.
    11. Thaize Challier, M.-Christine, 2010. "Socio-political conflict, social distance, and rent extraction in historical perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-67, March.
    12. Bernasconi, Michele, 2006. "Redistributive taxation in democracies: Evidence on people's satisfaction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 809-837, December.
    13. Angélica Sánchez & Thomas Goda, 2018. "Corruption and the ‘Paradox of Redistribution’," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 675-693, November.
    14. Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2003. "Limits to redistribution in a democracy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 651-668, November.
    15. Gründler, Klaus & Köllner, Sebastian, 2020. "Culture, diversity, and the welfare state," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 913-932.
    16. Patrick Bernhagen & Thomas Bräuninger, 2005. "Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(1), pages 43-64, March.
    17. Dina Balalaeva, 2012. "Innovations as Public Goods Provision with Negative Externalities: Role of Parliamentarism," HSE Working papers WP BRP 06/PS/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    18. Luna Bellani & Heinrich Ursprung, 2016. "The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 6189, CESifo.
    19. Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2000. "Invest, expropriate, or wait? Expected income and the demand for redistribution," Discussion Papers, Series I 305, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.

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