IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v116y2003i3-4p351-66.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Eating the Rich vs. Feeding the Poor: Borrowing Constraints and the Reluctance to Redistribute

Author

Listed:
  • Harms, Philipp
  • Zink, Stefan

Abstract

This paper offers an explanation why most democracies are characterized by moderate taxation of wealth although the wealth distribution is persistently skewed to the right. We model an economy in which agents have to acquire higher education to qualify for skilled work and in which capital market imperfections prevent poor individuals from making such a profitable human capital investment. If these borrowing constraints do not bind for members of the middle class, they may rationally reject redistribution although both the current and the future median of the wealth distribution are below the mean. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2003. "Eating the Rich vs. Feeding the Poor: Borrowing Constraints and the Reluctance to Redistribute," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 351-366, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:116:y:2003:i:3-4:p:351-66
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philippe Aghion & Abhijit Banerjee & Thomas Piketty, 1999. "Dualism and Macroeconomic Volatility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1359-1397.
    2. Roland Benabou & Efe A. Ok, 2001. "Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The Poum Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 447-487.
    3. Friedrich Breyer & Heinrich Ursprung, 1998. "Are the rich too rich to be expropriated?: Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 135-156, January.
    4. Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, 1993. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 35-52.
    5. Owen, Ann L. & Weil, David N., 1998. "Intergenerational earnings mobility, inequality and growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 71-104, February.
    6. Roland Bénabou, 1996. "Inequality and Growth," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, Volume 11, pages 11-92 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-298, April.
    8. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2000. "Endogenous Inequality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 743-759.
    9. Hindriks, Jean, 2001. "Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 43-50, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:mje:mjejnl:v:13:y:2017:i:2:p:121-127 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Loukas Balafoutas, 2011. "How much income redistribution? An explanation based on vote-buying and corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 185-203, January.
    3. Sebastián Galiani, 2013. "Social Mobility: What is it and Why Does it Matter?," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 59, pages 167-229, January-D.
    4. repec:mje:mjejnl:v:12:y:2017:i:2:p:121-127 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2003. "Limits to redistribution in a democracy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 651-668, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:116:y:2003:i:3-4:p:351-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.