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Risk-Aversion and Social Mobility: The Impossibility of Order-Preserving Income Redistributions

Author

Listed:
  • Leif Danziger
  • Heinrich Ursprung

Abstract

The traditional criticism notwithstanding, we show that social mobility can, in principle, explain political income redistributions. Nonetheless, the social-mobility argument for redistribution is not satisfactory, as actual transition probabilities are not consistent with order-preserving redistributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Leif Danziger & Heinrich Ursprung, 2000. "Risk-Aversion and Social Mobility: The Impossibility of Order-Preserving Income Redistributions," CESifo Working Paper Series 321, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_321
    as

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    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo_wp321.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas Piketty, 1995. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 551-584.
    2. Roland Benabou & Efe A. Ok, 2001. "Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The Poum Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 447-487.
    3. Louis Putterman & John E. Roemer & Joaquim Silvestre, 1998. "Does Egalitarianism Have a Future?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 861-902, June.
    4. Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2000. "Invest, expropriate, or wait? Expected income and the demand for redistribution," Discussion Papers, Series I 305, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    5. Hans Peter Gruner & Giacomo Corneo, 2000. "Social Limits to Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1491-1507, December.
    6. Joachim Wessels, 1993. "Redistribution from a constitutional perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 425-448, September.
    7. Friedrich Breyer & Heinrich Ursprung, 1998. "Are the rich too rich to be expropriated?: Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 135-156, January.
    8. Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December.
    9. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
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