Risk-Aversion and Social Mobility: The Impossibility of Order-Preserving Income Redistributions
The traditional criticism notwithstanding, we show that social mobility can, in principle, explain political income redistributions. Nonetheless, the social-mobility argument for redistribution is not satisfactory, as actual transition probabilities are not consistent with order-preserving redistributions.
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