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Spend It Like Beckham? Inequality and Redistribution in the UK, 1983-2004

  • Andreas Georgiadis
  • Alan Manning

A main activity of the state is to redistribute resources. Models of the political process generally predict that a rise in inequality will lead to more redistribution. This paper shows that, for the UK in the period 1983-2004, a plausibly exogenous rise in income inequality has not been associated with increased redistribution. We then explore this further using attitudinal data. We show that the demand for redistribution, having shown considerable variation over time, is at an all-time low. We argue that the decline in the demand for redistribution can mostly be accounted for by an increasing belief in the importance of incentives though changes in preferences over the distribution of income have been important in some sub-periods.

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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0816.

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Date of creation: Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0816
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP

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