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La redistribution fiscale face au chômage

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  • Thomas Piketty

Abstract

[eng] In France, the main objective of structural tax/benefit reform has been to cut low-wage payroll contributions, so as to cut labor costs and boost low-wage labor demand. Other countries, such as the U.S., have tried to boost low-wage labor supply by granting earned income tax credits to low-wage workers. This papers takes into account both demand and supply effects at different wage levels and offers a theoretical analysis of these strategies, as well as a numerical application to the french case. The main conclusion is that the very high effective marginal tax rates (80-90 %) imposed on low-wage workers in France, even though they admit some theoretical justifications, have problably reached their limits, and that significant job creations could be obtained by cutting those rates, for exemple by cutting the employee payroll tax imposed at the level of the minimum wage. The employer payroll tax cuts introduced by the Balladur-Juppé governments can only stimulate labor demand, since they vanish at a very high rate in case they are shifted to the employee. It is possible that this reduces dratiscally their efficiency. [fre] En France, les stratégies de réforme fiscale pour lutter contre le chômage se sont concentrées sur la baisse du coût du travail à bas salaire, afin de relancer la demande pour ce type de travail. D'autres pays, dont les Etats- Unis, se sont concentrés sur la relance de l'offre de travail à bas salaire avec des mécanismes d'allégement d'impôts et de transferts fiscaux pour les bas salaires. En prenant en compte à la fois les facteurs d'offre de travail à différents niveaux de revenus et les facteurs de demande de travail pour différents types d'emplois, ce texte propose une analyse théorique de ces différents choix ainsi qu'une application numérique au cas français. La principale conclusion est que les taux marginaux effectifs extrêmement élevés (80-90 %) imposés en France sur la transition du non-emploi vers un emploi à bas salaire, même si on peut leur trouver des justifications théoriques, ont certainement atteint leurs limites, et qu'un nombre significatif de créations d'emplois pourrait être obtenu en les abaissant, par exemple en réduisant les cotisations sociales salariales au niveau du S.M.I.C. Les allégements de cotisations patronales sur les bas salaires des gouvernements Balladur-Juppé ne permettent d'agir que sur la demande, et non pas à la fois sur l'offre et sur la demande de travail à bas salaire, car ils disparaissent très vite s'ils sont utilisés pour augmenter le salaire net. Il est possible que cela en limite fortement l'efficacité.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Piketty, 1997. "La redistribution fiscale face au chômage," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 12(1), pages 157-201.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1997_num_12_1_1016
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1997.1016
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Saez, Emmanuel, 2004. "Direct or indirect tax instruments for redistribution: short-run versus long-run," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 503-518, March.
    2. Jacquet, Laurence & Lehmann, Etienne & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2013. "Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1770-1805.
    3. Findeisen, Sebastian & Sachs, Dominik, 2017. "Redistribution and insurance with simple tax instruments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 58-78.
    4. Boadway, Robin & Jacquet, Laurence, 2008. "Optimal marginal and average income taxation under maximin," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 425-441, November.
    5. Andreas Georgiadis & Alan Manning, 2012. "Spend it like Beckham? Inequality and redistribution in the UK, 1983–2004," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 537-563, June.
    6. Huang, Jason & Rios, Juan, 2016. "Optimal tax mix with income tax non-compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 52-63.
    7. François Legendre & Jean-Paul Lorgnet & Florence Thibault, 2003. "La distribution des incitations financières au travail en France : l'évaluation du modèle Myriade," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 23-48.
    8. Findeisen, Sebastian & Sachs, Dominik, 2014. "Efficient Labor and Capital Income Taxation over the Life Cycle," Working Papers 14-17, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    9. Etienne Lehmann, 2003. "Évaluation de la mise en place d’un système d’allocation universelle en présence de qualifications hétérogènes : le rôle institutionnel du salaire minimum," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 157(1), pages 31-50.
    10. Immervoll, Herwig & Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen & Kreiner, Claus Thustrup & Verdelin, Nicolaj, 2011. "Optimal tax and transfer programs for couples with extensive labor supply responses," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1485-1500.
    11. Chone, Philippe & Laroque, Guy, 2005. "Optimal incentives for labor force participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 395-425, February.
    12. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2009. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 537-560, March.
    13. David Spector, 2001. "Emploi : une analyse critique des politiques malthusiennes," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 13-31.
    14. Lehmann, Etienne & Parmentier, Alexis & Van Der Linden, Bruno, 2011. "Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1523-1537.
    15. Étienne Lehmann, 2016. "A la recherche des incitations perdues : pour une fusion de la prime d’activité, de la CSG, des cotisations sociales et de l’impôt sur le revenu," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 153-185.
    16. repec:pri:cepsud:178lee is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Simula, Laurent & Trannoy, Alain, 2010. "Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 163-173, February.
    18. Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2012. "Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 751-782, October.
    19. Olivier Bargain & Claire Keane, 2010. "Tax–Benefit‐revealed Redistributive Preferences Over Time: Ireland 1987–2005," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 24(s1), pages 141-167, December.
    20. Aron Kiss, 2013. "The optimal top marginal tax rate: Application to Hungary," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 2(2), pages 100-118, December.
    21. Dominik Sachs & Aleh Tsyvinski & Nicolas Werquin, 2016. "A Theory of Asset Prices Based on Heterogeneous Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2051, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    22. Spencer Bastani & Laurent Simula, 2014. "Commentaires. Évaluer les limites à la redistribution : approches partielles ou approche globale ?," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 467(1), pages 163-171.
    23. Picard, Pierre M., 2001. "Job additionality and deadweight spending in perfectly competitive industries: the case for optimal employment subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 521-541, March.

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