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Bribing votes: a new explanation to the "inequality-redistribution" puzzle in LDC's

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  • Frédéric Docquier
  • Essaïd Tarbalouti

Abstract

The recent empirical literature on redistribution and development emphasizes two main evidences: (i) more redistribution generally induces higher growth rates and (ii) more inequality does not necessarily increase the political demand for redistribution. These stylized facts are at odds with the correlations observed in developed countries. Several theoretical arguments can be advanced to explain these puzzles. In this paper, it is shown that "vote purchases" may be seen as an additional argument to explain puzzle (ii). We formalize this idea and examine the conditions under which vote bribes may be an obstacle to redistribution (and thus to growth) in a developing economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Docquier & Essaïd Tarbalouti, 2001. "Bribing votes: a new explanation to the "inequality-redistribution" puzzle in LDC's," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/229581, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/229581
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    Cited by:

    1. David Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2009. "Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 187-219, July.
    2. Andreas Georgiadis & Alan Manning, 2012. "Spend it like Beckham? Inequality and redistribution in the UK, 1983–2004," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 537-563, June.
    3. David De La Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2011. "Democracy, Rule of Law, Corruption Incentives, and Growth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(2), pages 155-187, April.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Mühe, Felix, 2011. "Vote-Buying And Growth," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(05), pages 656-680, November.
    5. David De La Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2008. "Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions," Post-Print halshs-00129741, HAL.
    6. Anbarci, Nejat & Escaleras, Monica & Register, Charles A., 2005. "Earthquake fatalities: the interaction of nature and political economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1907-1933, September.
    7. repec:eee:wdevel:v:96:y:2017:i:c:p:136-144 is not listed on IDEAS

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