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Earthquake fatalities: the interaction of nature and political economy

  • Anbarci, Nejat
  • Escaleras, Monica
  • Register, Charles A.

In our theoretical model, we show that as per capita income decreases and the level of inequality increases, different segments of society are less likely to agree on the distribution of the burden of the necessary collective action, causing the relatively-wealthy simply to self-insure against the disaster while leaving the relatively-poor to its mercy. We then evaluate 269 large earthquakes occurring worldwide (1960-2002), taking into account other factors such as an earthquake's magnitude, depth and proximity to population centers. Using a Negative Binomial estimation strategy with both random and fixed estimators, we find strong evidence of the theoretical model’s predictions.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 89 (2005)
Issue (Month): 9-10 (September)
Pages: 1907-1933

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:89:y:2005:i:9-10:p:1907-1933
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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