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Political Profit: Taxing and Spending in Democracies and Dictatorships

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  • Alfred G. Cuzán

Abstract

. The economic analysis of the power to tax and spend, or what Franz Oppenheimer called “the political means,” is applied to democracies and to dictatorships. The constraints imposed by democracies and dictatorships on the “iron law of political redistribution” and the “law of hierarchical centralization” are examined. It is shown that the fiscal exploitation inherent in these two laws of political profit reaches its fullest potential in a dictatorship, where a single firm attempts to monopolize the government by forbidding competition to its rule. Democracy and capitalism are correlatives, since they both rest upon rights, which necessarily imply property. Both socialism and dictatorship destroy rights, the former by abolishing private ownership over capital and resources, the latter by forbidding the use of such resources for the purpose of competing against the ruling group. The greater the centralization of the State, the greater its capacity to expand its power; and the greater the scope of the State, the more economical it becomes to centralize the government, with force if necessary. Thus, dictatorship and socialism converge in despotism.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred G. Cuzán, 1981. "Political Profit: Taxing and Spending in Democracies and Dictatorships," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 329-340, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:40:y:1981:i:4:p:329-340
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1981.tb01648.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Thaize Challier, M.-Christine, 2010. "Socio-political conflict, social distance, and rent extraction in historical perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-67, March.

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