The political economy of the peruvian urban water sector
The study starts with a theoretical framework that is built on previous research on regulation and political economy. It is followed by an overview of the Peruvian water sector and the political system of the country in the following section. In section four, the qualitative analysis is presented. In section five the quantitative approaches are carried out. It starts by a test for political budget cycles and partisan effects followed by an examination of the median voter theorem. Finally, section six discusses the results and concludes.
|Date of creation:||2012|
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