IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v22y2010i3p446-470.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Electoral Cycles Through Lobbying

Author

Listed:
  • MARCO BONOMO
  • CRISTINA TERRA

Abstract

In this paper, we build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our setup to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures, and real exchange rates. Copyright 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Bonomo & Cristina Terra, 2010. "Electoral Cycles Through Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 446-470, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:446-470
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00371.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Filipe R. Campante & Guido Tabellini, 2008. "Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1006-1036, September.
    2. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
    3. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    4. Grier, Kevin & Hernandez-Trillo, Fausto, 2007. "The real exchange rate process and its real effects: The cases of Mexico and the USA," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-25, May.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:04:p:1467-1487_26 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:hrv:faseco:34729976 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Ernesto H. Stein & Natalia Salazar & Roberto Steiner & Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla & Marco Bonomo & Juan C. Jaramillo & Hector E. Schamis & Alberto Pascó-Front & Piero Ghezzi & Maria Cristina Terra & José De, 2001. "The Currency Game: Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 77398 edited by Ernesto H. Stein & Jeffry Frieden, February.
    8. Marco Bonomo & Cristina Terra, 2005. "Elections And Exchange Rate Policy Cycles," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 151-176, July.
    9. Alt, James E. & Lassen, David Dreyer, 2006. "Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1403-1439, August.
    10. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
    11. repec:idb:brikps:77398 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Susanne Lohmann, 1998. "Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 1-17, March.
    13. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    14. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    15. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
    16. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    17. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    18. Lindbeck, Assar, 1976. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 1-19, May.
    19. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
    20. Ronald Kneebone & Kenneth McKenzie, 2001. "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(5), pages 753-774, November.
    21. Ernesto H. Stein & Jorge M. Streb & Piero Ghezzi, 2005. "Real Exchange Rate Cycles Around Elections," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 297-330, November.
    22. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    23. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    24. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of Democratic Government and the Benefits of a Constitution," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(3), pages 367-388, July.
    25. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    26. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    27. repec:idb:idbbks:391 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cunha, Alexandre B. & Ornelas, Emanuel, 2017. "The Limits of Political Compromise: Debt Ceilings and Political Turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 11945, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Sainan Huang & Cristina Terra, 2016. "Exchange Rate Populism," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 105-132, March.
    3. Manjhi, Ganesh & Mehra, Meeta Keswani, 2017. "Dynamics of the Economics of Special Interest Politics," Working Papers 17/206, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:446-470. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.