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Merchants of Corruption: How Entrepreneurs Manufacture and Supply Bribes

  • Ufere, Nnaoke
  • Perelli, Sheri
  • Boland, Richard
  • Carlsson, Bo
Registered author(s):

    We wondered how corruption, endemic in Nigeria, is experienced by a specific and understudied set of actors—entrepreneurs. Semi-structured interviews with founders/CEOs of firms in three industries associated with high levels of corruption revealed entrepreneurs—rather than victims of bribe demanding government agents—are themselves active perpetrators of bribery, adopting a set of “bribery best practices” governed by a well-embedded set of social norms, rules, routines, and power relations to deliberately subvert formal state budgetary systems. While reforming institutions is a key focus of anti-corruption policies in many Sub-Saharan African countries, our results suggest a bottom-up approach to remediation based on understanding the practice from the perspective of those who actively engage in it.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

    Volume (Year): 40 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 12 ()
    Pages: 2440-2453

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:12:p:2440-2453
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

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