Corruption in procurement and public purchase
The paper studies the impact of corruption threat in procurement an dpublic purchases. It explores the consequences of the unobservability of people integrity and considers the problem of both capture and extortion. It shows that extortion is not fight against because it is not harmful to the principal, contrary to capture which is costly. This distinction implies that when corruptibility increases among the population the optimal answer of the organization is to shift from a capture regime to an extortion regime.
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