Corruption in procurement and public purchase
The paper studies the impact of corruption threat in procurement an dpublic purchases. It explores the consequences of the unobservability of people integrity and considers the problem of both capture and extortion. It shows that extortion is not fight against because it is not harmful to the principal, contrary to capture which is costly. This distinction implies that when corruptibility increases among the population the optimal answer of the organization is to shift from a capture regime to an extortion regime.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 99-118, April.
- Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999.
"Corruption, extortion and evasion,"
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- HINDRIKS, Jean & KEEN, Michael & MUTHOO, Abhinay, . "Corruption, extortion and evasion," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1671, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1998. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Discussion Papers 9809, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1996. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Papers 179, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
- Jean Hindriks, Michael Keen and Abhinay Muthoo, . "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Economics Discussion Papers 470, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
- repec:cai:recosp:reco_p1996_47n5_1179 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1991.
"A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
91-15, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 117-136, January.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1991. "A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence," Working Papers 91-15, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Domberger, Simon & Hall, Christine & Li, Eric Ah Lik, 1995. "The Determinants of Price and Quality in Competitively Tendered Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(433), pages 1454-70, November.
- Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993.
"Collusion in Hierarchical Agency,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-56, May.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1990. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-01, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1990. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Working Papers 91-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992.
"Regulation by Duopoly,"
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Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 507-33, Fall.
- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 1997. "Regulatory blackmail in procurement relationships," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9701, CEPREMAP.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, June.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1997. "Credible threats in extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 23-39, May.
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