Flexible and mandatory banking supervision
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- De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca & Ponce, Jorge, 2018. "Flexible and mandatory banking supervision," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-104.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio & Jorge Ponce, 2016. "Flexible and Mandatory Banking Supervision," Documentos de trabajo 2016005, Banco Central del Uruguay.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio & Jorge Ponce, 2016. "Flexible and Mandatory Banking Supervision," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2016-09, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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- Fan, Yaoyao & Huang, Yichu & Jiang, Yuxiang & Liu, Frank Hong, 2020. "Watch out for bailout: TARP and bank earnings management," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
- Masciandaro, Donato & Peia, Oana & Romelli, Davide, 2020. "Banking supervision and external auditors: Theory and empirics," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 46(C).
- José Américo Pereira Antunes, 2021. "To supervise or to self-supervise: a machine learning based comparison on credit supervision," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 7(1), pages 1-21, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Banking supervision; Regulatory capture;JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2018-02-26 (Central Banking)
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