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Une note sur l'effet d'échantillonnage


  • Emmanuelle Auriol


[eng] This paper analyses within a static model, the trade-off between the sampling advantage of duopolistic structures and the economies of scale of a monopoly. The duopoly structure provides a larger sample of producers that reduces expec­ted costs as the lowest of two possible total costs is used for final production - the sampling effect - but generates duplication of fixed costs. The optimal market structure (monopoly or duopoly) results from a trade-off between the fixed costs and the variable costs. Moreover since the firms are ex-ante asymmetric, it is not always the most efficient that produces at the optimum. The choice of the produ­cer is the result of a trade-off between variable and informational costs. [fre] Dans cet article, on étudie l'arbitrage qui existe entre les économies d'échelle associées à un monopole et le gain réalisé sur le coût variable d'acquisition quand on dispose au contraire d'un échantillon plus important : l'effet d'échantillonnage. On étudie la structure de marché optimale (monopole ou duopole) issue de cet arbitrage quand les paramètres de coût des entreprises sont indépendants mais différemment distribués. On montre que ce n'est pas nécessairement l'entreprise qui a un avantage technologique (au sens de la dominance stochastique) qui est sélectionnée à l'optimum d'information asymétrique de monopole, pas plus que ce n'est l'entreprise eflicace (celle qui a le coût marginal bas) qui est choisie à l'opti­mum de duopole.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuelle Auriol, 1996. "Une note sur l'effet d'échantillonnage," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(5), pages 1179-1201.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_5_409843
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409843

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    2. repec:adr:anecst:y:1993:i:31:p:01 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
    4. Emmanuelle Auriol, 1993. "Monopole ou duopole: l'effet de comparaison," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 31, pages 1-31.
    5. Dalen, D.M., 1995. "Yardstick Competition and Investment Incentives," Memorandum 33/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    6. repec:adr:anecst:y:1993:i:31 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington & Pablo T. Spiller, 1987. "Managing Supplier Switching," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 77-97, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Søreide, Tina, 2017. "An economic analysis of debarment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 36-49.
    2. repec:eee:ecmode:v:68:y:2018:i:c:p:450-460 is not listed on IDEAS

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