Procurement and Predation: Dynamic Sourcing from Financially Constrained Suppliers
This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agencyâ€™s optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By considering a dynamic setting, both present and future consequences and incentives are taken into account.
|Date of creation:||30 Oct 2013|
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