Wild Bids. Gambling for Resurrection in Procurement Contracts
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- Aleix Calveras & Juan J. Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2001. "Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts," Economics Working Papers 553, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2001.
References listed on IDEAS
- Juan J. Ganuza, 1998. "Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts," Economics Working Papers 471, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2002.
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- David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016.
"How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships,"
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- Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2015. "The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 234-261.
- Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1017, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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- Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2017. "Can the Private Sector Ensure the Public Interest? Evidence from Federal Procurement," CEIS Research Paper 411, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 20 Jul 2017.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2014. "Bidding under auctioneer default risk," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 123-133.
- Baghestanian, Sascha & Massenot, Baptiste, 2015. "Predictably irrational: Gambling for resurrection in experimental asset markets?," SAFE Working Paper Series 104, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
More about this item
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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