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Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts

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  • Malin Arve
  • David Martimort

Abstract

We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of the add-on but hardens information revelation for the basic service. The interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions, contract renegotiation, and the value of incomplete contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016. "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3238-3274, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:11:p:3238-74
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150275
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:indorg:v:57:y:2018:i:c:p:35-83 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2015. "Project modifications and bidding in highway procurement auctions," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2015-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    3. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Rohit Lamba & Ilia Krasikov, 2017. "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints," 2017 Meeting Papers 1544, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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