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Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships

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  • Oliver Hart

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in an advanced capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I discuss some recent theoretical thinking on this issue. I divide the paper into two parts. First, I make some general remarks about the relationship between the theoretical literature on privatisation and incomplete contracting theories of the firm. Second, I use some of the ideas from this literature to develop a very preliminary model of public-private partnerships. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Hart, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages 69-76, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:113:y:2003:i:486:p:c69-c76
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen King & Rohan Pitchford, 2008. "Private or Public? Towards a Taxonomy of Optimal Ownership and Management Regimes," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 84(266), pages 366-377, September.
    2. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2001. "Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1343-1372.
    3. Bennett, John & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2006. "Building and managing facilities for public services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2143-2160, November.
    4. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    5. repec:hrv:faseco:30727607 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Grout, Paul A, 1997. "The Economics of the Private Finance Initiative," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(4), pages 53-66, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Une économie optimale des partenariats publics-privés: est-ce possible?
      by Myriam.DAHMANSAIDI@iedom-guadeloupe.fr (Myriam Dahman-Saïdi) in BS Initiative on 2014-06-11 13:05:23
    2. Une économie optimale des partenariats publics-privés: est-ce possible?
      by Myriam.DAHMANSAIDI@iedom-guadeloupe.fr (Myriam Dahman-Saïdi) in BS Initiative on 2014-06-11 13:05:23

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Takeshi Nishimura, 2014. "Sequential procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(3), pages 229-252, November.
    2. Carlos Díaz Alvarado & Alejandro Izquierdo & Ugo Panizza, 2004. "Fiscal Sustainability in Emerging Market Countries with an Application to Ecuador," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1536, Inter-American Development Bank.
    3. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    4. Buso, Marco & Marty, Frederic & Tran, Phuong Tra, 2017. "Public-private partnerships from budget constraints: Looking for debt hiding?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 56-84.
    5. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
    7. John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2010. "Contracting out public service provision to not-for-profit firms," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 784-802, October.
    8. Carlos Díaz Alvarado & Alejandro Izquierdo & Ugo Panizza, 2004. "Viabilidad fiscal en países de mercados emergentes con un enfoque en Ecuador," Research Department Publications 4372, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
    10. Hodaka Morita & Maroš Servátka, 2016. "Does Group Identity Prevent Inefficient Investment in Outside Options? An Experimental Investigation," Research in Experimental Economics,in: Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 105-126 Emerald Publishing Ltd.
    11. Radygin, Alexander & Entov, Revold, 2013. ""Fundamental" theorem of privatization: ideology, evolution, practice," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 7-45, December.
    12. repec:bla:jemstr:v:26:y:2017:i:3:p:636-660 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Alessandro Marra, 2006. "Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities," Bruges European Economic Research Papers 4, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe.
    14. Li, Sanxi & Sun, Hailin & Yan, Jianye & Yu, Jun, 2015. "Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 96-106.
    15. Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2017. "From fixed to state-dependent duration in public-private partnerships," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, pages 636-660.
    16. Howell, Bronwyn & Sadowski, Bert, 2014. "Anatomy of a Public-Private Partnership: Hold-up and regulatory risk in an NGN PPP," 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106872, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    17. Paul A. Grout, 2003. "Public and Private Sector Discount Rates in Public-Private Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages 62-68, March.
    18. Perotti,Enrico C., 2004. "State ownership - a residual role?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3407, The World Bank.
    19. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & LUCIANO GRECO, 2015. "Imperfect Bundling in Public–Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 136-146, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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