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Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"

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The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contract and Mechanism Design" of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing avenues for future research. Several of the papers contained in the Symposium issue were presented at the Economic Theory Workshop of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University in June 2013.

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  • Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2016
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    Cited by:

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    4. Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016. "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3238-3274, November.
    5. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 1022, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2019.
    6. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    7. Liu, Bin & Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2020. "Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    8. David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 311-347, June.
    9. Karakoç, Gülen & Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2022. "The value of transparency in dynamic contracting with entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    10. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction," Papers 2106.04850, arXiv.org.
    11. Akifumi Ishihara, 2016. "Role of Information Rents in Relational Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 936-957, December.
    12. Chifeng Dai, 2021. "Optimal sequential contract with a risk‐averse supplier," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 92-125, February.
    13. Bhattacharjee, Swagata, 2022. "Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 534-552.
    14. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers," Papers 2105.07649, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    15. Rohit Lamba & Ilia Krasikov, 2017. "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints," 2017 Meeting Papers 1544, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Chifeng Dai, 2022. "Optimal risk sharing with ex post private information: Rules versus discretion," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(1), pages 160-184, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic mechanism design; Dynamic contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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