IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

The Value of Transparency in Dynamic Contracting with Entry

Listed author(s):
Registered author(s):

    A manufacturer designs a dynamic contract with a retailer who is privately informed about demand and faces competition by an integrated entrant in a second period. Since the entrant only observes demand after entry and demand is correlated across periods, information about past demand affects the entrant’s production. We analyze the incentives of the incumbent players to share information with the entrant and show that the retailer benefits from transparency, but the manufacturer does not. Contrary to what intuition suggests, transparency with an integrated entrant harms consumers. When the entrant is not an integrated firm, whether transparency benefits consumers depends on the degree of demand persistency.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp482.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 482.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 02 Sep 2017
    Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:482
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    I-80126 Napoli

    Phone: +39 081 - 675372
    Fax: +39 081 - 675372
    Web page: http://www.csef.it/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:482. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.