Optimal Design for Social Learning
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
- Daron Acemoglu & Ali Makhdoumi & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2017. "Fast and Slow Learning From Reviews," NBER Working Papers 24046, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Most related itemsThese are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
- Le, Phuong, 2018. "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Shrestha, Ratna K., 2017. "Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-7.
- Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C., 2007.
"Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 335-366, January.
- MISHRA, Debasis & PARKES, David C., 2005. "Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim, 2015. "An Approximate Auction," Working Papers 2015:19, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Samuel D. Bell & Nadia A. Streletskaya, 2019. "The Random Quantity Mechanism: Laboratory and Field Tests of a Novel Cost-Revealing Procurement Mechanism," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 899-921, July.
- Alessandra Casella & Adam B. Cox, 2018.
"A Property Rights Approach to Temporary Work Visas,"
The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(S1), pages 195-227.
- Casella, Alessandra & Cox, Adam, 2017. "A Property Rights Approach to Temporary Work Visas," CEPR Discussion Papers 12287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- SaÄŸlam, YiÄŸit & Ho, Phuong & Daglish, Toby, 2012. "Auctioning the Digital Dividend: a Model for Spectrum," Working Paper Series 4129, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Dan Levin, 2005. "Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 467-471, March.
- Iftekhar, M.S. & Tisdell, J.G. & Connor, J.D., 2013. "Effects of competition on environmental water buyback auctions," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 59-73.
- Shengwu Li, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
- Gärtner, Dennis L. & Schmutzler, Armin, 2009.
"Merger negotiations and ex-post regret,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1636-1664, July.
- Dennis Gaertner & Armin Schmutzler, 2006. "Merger Negotiations and Ex-Post Regret," SOI - Working Papers 0607, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Dec 2007.
- Gärtner, Dennis & Schmutzler, Armin, 2006. "Merger Negotiations and Ex-Post Regret," CEPR Discussion Papers 5911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneerâ€™s Discretionin VCG Combinatorial Auction (Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018.)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-359, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Robert Kleinberg & Bo Waggoner & E. Glen Weyl, 2016. "Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search," Papers 1603.07682, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2016.
- Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2015. "Efficient Allocations in Economies with Asymmetric Information when the Realized Frequency of Types is Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/04, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- John Kagel & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Lixin Ye, 2007.
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 103-119, October.
- Lixin Ye & John Kagel & Svetlana Pevnitska, 2004. "Survival Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 414, Econometric Society.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019.
"Obviousness around the clock,"
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior
SP II 2019-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019. "Obviousness Around the Clock," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 151, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- A. Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2015.
"An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 769-784, August.
- Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2011. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Paper 2011-096, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2011. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Other publications TiSEM 49292c72-515d-42f4-a0d4-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2013. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 13/31, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges," CARF F-Series CARF-F-258, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Pär Holmberg, 2017.
"Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 372-395, October.
- Holmberg, Pär, 2014. "Pro-Competitive Rationing in Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Paper Series 1037, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Pär Holmberg, 2014. "Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions," Working Papers EPRG 1414, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
- Pär Holmberg, 2014. "Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1435, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Ranaldo, Angelo & Rossi, Enzo, 2016.
"Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution,"
Working Papers on Finance
1609, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
- Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2016. "Uniform-price auctions for Swiss government bonds: Origin and evolution," Economic Studies 2016-10, Swiss National Bank.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-MIC-2015-09-26 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001075. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.